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An Essay on the Determination
of Relevancy Under the
Federal Rules of Evidence
Arthur H. Travcrs, Jr.*
The scope of the general definition of "relevant evidence" in the
Federal Rules of Evidence is ambiguous. It is unclear whether Con-
gress, for instance, intended that certain issues be considered legisla-
tively determined or that those issues rest within the discretion of the
courts. There is also some uncertainty over the definition's applicabil-
ity to several types of evidence-particularly undisputed facts such as
those that provide background information or are judicially admitted.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Process of Determining Relevancy
By the time work began on the Federal Rules of Evidence, no serious dispute
existed about the questions to consider in determining whether an item of
evidence challenged as "irrelevant" was admissible. The first step requires
identifying precisely the proposition or propositions the evidence is offered to
prove. I Several issues are involved at this stage. At least one of the proposi-
tions must be provable under the governing substantive law, and the evidence
must increase or decrease the probability that the proposition is true. It may
Professor of Law, University of Colorado. B.A. 1957, Grinnell College; LL.B. 1962, Harvard
University.
The author wishes to thank his colleague William T. Pizzi and Professor Christopher
Mueller of the University of Wyoming, as well as the editorial staff of the Arizona State Law
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1. As Professor James explained in a classic article:
Relevancy . . . is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence but exists as
a relation between an item of evidence and a proposition sought to be proved. If an
item of evidence tends to prove or to disprove any proposition, it is relevant to that
proposition. If the proposition itself is one provable in the case at bar, or if it in turn
forms a further link in a chain of proof the final proposition of which is provable in
the case at bar, then the item offered has probative value 
in the case.
James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 CALIF. L. REV. 689, 690 (1941).
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occur that none of the suggested propositions is provable because none is of
consequence under the substantive law. 2
On the other hand, even if the proposition to which the evidence is directed
is of consequence under pertinent substantive law, the parties may have
removed it from the case by stipulation or another pretrial device. Neverthe-
less, the party making an admission may seek relief from the conclusive effect
of the admission, or the party benefiting from the admission may wish to offer
proof of the admitted fact. In such cases the real question is often whether a
judicial admission will bar proof of the admitted proposition. This question,
too, may be posed in terms of the relevancy of the evidence.
If these threshold inquiries satisfactorily establish that an item has some
probative worth, it is then necessary to decide if that value is sufficiently great
to incur the costs entailed in admitting the item. Although evidence excluded at
this stage has sometimes been labelled irrelevant, the decision is different. The
threshold inquiries are based on experience and logic; the later decision
involves an evaluation of the evidence in the particular institutional context of
the trial of an issue of fact.
There are at least two broad classes of costs to be considered in deciding
whether to admit evidence having some probative value. The first concerns the
consumption of time. At a minimum the introduction of any item of evidence
costs the time involved in the presentation of that evidence. It also includes the
time consumed by receiving evidence that must be admitted once the first item
is received, but that otherwise would have been excluded. The second class is
comprised of ways in which an item of evidence may distort the fact-finding
process. Evidence may induce the jury to decide against a party on emotional
grounds. It may also induce an erroneous judgment because it is over-valued or
because it diverts the jury's attention from the real issues.
There is also a third class of costs, less openly acknowledged but apparently
2. For example, suppose there is a conflict between the holder of an unperfected article 9
security interest in certain goods and a judgment creditor of the debtor who has levied upon
those goods. The holder of the security interest offers evidence that tends to show that the lien
creditor knew of the unperfected security interest when he levied. The evidence would be
relevant under the 1962 official text of the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides that a
lien creditor defeats the holder of an unperfected security interest only if the latter had no
knowledge of the interest when he became a lien creditor. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1962 Official
Text). But under the 1972 official text the evidence would no longer be relevant because the
unperfected security interest is now subject to the rights of the lien creditor whether the latter
knows of the interest or not. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(b) (1972 Official Text).
All that has been changed is the substantive law, but that change converts the evidence from
relevant to irrelevant. The fact that courts often mask determinations of the substantive law
by casting their decisions as rulings on evidence has frequently been noted. See, e.g., James,
supra note i, at 691-93. In the hypothesized case it is unlikely that the basis of the decision
would be misunderstood, but there are cases in which it is difficult to tell whether the point of
law decided is substantive or evidentiary.
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decisive in shaping certain specific exclusionary rules: interference with the
attainment of some socially desirable objective unrelated to the goal of accurate
resolution of disputed issues of fact. 3 In sum, when evidence is admitted it may
safely be concluded that at least one of the propositions to which an item of
evidence is related is properly provable in the case, and that the item has
sufficient probative value to make the risks and costs involved in using it worth
incurring. When evidence is excluded, it has necessarily failed at least one of
the tests.
B. The Prospects for Codification
Given a consensus on how relevance is determined, the question of what
codification can accomplish arises. Testifying before the House Judiciary
Committee, Judge Friendly warned: "[E]vidence to me seems just not the kind
of subject that lends itself very well to codification." Rules would "freeze the
law of evidence" between those occasions-necessarily far apart-when the
legislature might occupy itself with the task of revising rules of evidence.
Moreover, the rules would "stimulate appeals and increase reversals on
evidentiary rulings," a phenomenon not to be offset by any reduction in
appeals and reversals resulting from the added clarity that the rules would bring
to the field: "[T]hey are not clear and in the nature of things they cannot be that
clear. '4
Judge Friendly overstates the case somewhat, but it does appear true, at least
so far as the field of relevancy is concerned, that legislation can achieve but
modest successes. First, it would be impossible for the legislature to anticipate
more than a small percentage of the incredible variety of situations in which the
relevancy of some item of evidence might be tested, which implies that the
courts must retain the power to deal with a great many unanticipated cases. The
legislature may provide for this by declining to attempt anything more than a
partial codification, and acknowledging the courts' power to handle cases by
employing the analysis sketched above. Or it might attempt to codify that
analysis in the form of a general standard to be employed by the courts in all
cases for which a more specific statutory rule has not been provided. By this
3. For example, the exclusion of evidence relating to the subsequent repair of a condition that
caused an injury sued on seems to have been based on this notion. The inference that the
defendant, by making repairs, was acknowledging that the condition had been dangerous
seems perfectly plausible, and it should not be beyond the capability of counsel to offer
competing inferences. Therefore it is hard to say that the conduct has no probative value, is
too inflammatory, or would tend to mislead. However, apprehension that persons might delay
correcting dangerous conditions if the evidence were admissible led to the rule of exclusion.
4. Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal Criminal
Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 248
(1973) (statement of Judge Henry J. Friendly).
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latter technique the legislature could essay a comprehensive codification with-
out the danger of failing to provide for some cases.
Second, even if the legislature opted for this second course, it would not
accomplish a dramatic reshaping of the law. Not only is there consensus about
the analysis the courts are in fact employing, but there is agreement that this
analysis is essentially correct, however many problems may exist in its applica-
tion. A legislature providing a restatement of the analysis has little opportunity
to attempt a major conceptual reworking of the existing law.
On the other hand, if there is consensus about the process, there has been
none about nomenclature. Should evidence be labelled "relevant" if it has
some connection with a provable proposition, or only if it is sufficiently
probative to be admissible notwithstanding the costs involved? 5 If the proposi-
tions upon which the evidence bears are not provable in the case, is the
evidence just "irrelevant," or should some special word like "immaterial" be
used to describe this particular difficulty? 6 The absence of a standard terminol-
ogy was a source of confusion and uncertainty in the pre-rules law.
By providing authoritative definitions of the terms to be employed, the
legislature could make explicit the separate steps involved in analyzing the
probative qualities of an item of evidence and thereby clarify the bases of
opinions. If, for example, "relevant" were defined to encompass only the
property of having some probative value with regard to a provable proposition,
courts thereafter might be expected to find evidence "irrelevant" only if such
value were absent. There would be far less difficulty in distinguishing those
decisions from other cases in which "relevant" evidence was evaluated and
excluded as insufficiently probative.
One can now discern the outlines of a modest legislative contribution that
might avoid the pitfalls Judge Friendly feared. It could be comprehensive,
attempting to provide a rule of decision for all cases. An important part of the
enactment would be an articulation both of a general standard to be employed
by the courts in assessing the evidence and a specification of the factors to be
balanced against an item's probative yalue. The legislature might settle certain
marginal controversies about the types of factors to be considered, adding to or
subtracting from the set of factors previously employed by the courts. Overall
the legislation should be a restatement of the analysis previously employed
with its steps and vocabulary made more clear.
5. Wigmore is often associated with the latter position. See I J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 28 (3d ed.
1940).
6. See Ladd, Determination of Relevancy, 31 TUL. L. REV. 81, 83-85 (1956) (supporting the use of
separate terms). Cf. J. MICHAEL & M. ADLER, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROOF 93 (1931)
(advocating the use of the single term "relevancy").
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May the legislature usefully attempt more? May it, for example, treat by rule
questions raised by certain kinds of evidence that have been the subject of
repeated judicial treatment, like liability insurance or subsequent repairs?
Those who oppose codification appear to deny this possibility, arguing that
each decision evaluating an item of evidence is necessarily limited to its own
facts. Subtle changes can augment or diminish an item's probative value or
affect one's judgment about how much time it will take to receive it, how much
additional evidence it will generate, how inflammatory it is likely to be, and so
forth. A decision means only that in this case, between these parties, under
these circumstances, this item may or may not be admitted to prove this
proposition.
But if the legislator cannot speak generally, he cannot speak at all. This
implies that any legislative rule will be overbroad, lumping together cases that
have much in common, but call for a more discriminating treatment than the
legislature can provide.7 Assuming this is true, tension will be generated
between what appears to be commanded by the language and what is thought to
be sensible. Courts will be unable to eliminate this tension, and this in turn may
be what Judge Friendly foresaw when he spoke of appeals and reversals being
stimulated.
This is not an argument against legislating, but rather against attempting to
accomplish too much in the form of rules. The conclusion to which the
argument points is that the legislature should stop with the modest contribution
sketched above, which exhausts the possibilities for useful generalizing. But it
may then be said that a legislative effort containing no rules is not worth the
dislocation costs that inevitably accompany any legislative reworking of a
traditional common law subject.
Although enacting any statutory rules dealing with relevancy is risky, it
should be possible to avoid overbreadth by the careful phrasing of a small
number of rules addressed to well-defined trouble areas. The risks of doing so
may be reduced by discussion in legal periodicals. To that end, this article
outlines the present state of relevancy under the Federal Rules of Evidence and
examines the problems raised both by codification generally and by particular
rules.
C. An Overview of the Federal Rules
Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence is denominated "Relevancy and
7. Compare the suggestion of Professor Posner that the costs of securing legislative concurrence
on some pieces of legislation are sufficiently high to provide an additional impetus toward
inclusiveness in the statement of rules. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 423 (2d ed.
1977).
1977:327]
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Its Limits," but some of the rules in other articles-notably those dealing with
authentication of documents8 and with the competency 9 and impeachment' ° of
witnesses-might well have been classified as specialized rules of relevancy.
By and large, all these rules demonstrate that the drafters were acutely aware of
the theoretical matters just discussed. The rules resolve very little in an
authoritative, clear-cut fashion. Most questions are left to the courts' discre-
tion, guided by a general standard and by legislative delineation of the factors
to be weighed against the probative value of the evidence.
This has largely been accomplished by rules 401 through 403. Rule 402
provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided
by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or
by rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." Despite its brevity and
apparent simplicity, this rule is probably the most significant of all the Federal
Rules of Evidence. It most clearly indicates the drafters' purpose to deal
comprehensively with all questions of admissibility of evidence,"' not merely
to clarify or revise certain portions of the law, leaving the rest to judicial
development.
First, the rule divides all items of evidence into one of two classes: Evidence
is either relevant or it is not. No item can be both; nor can it be neither.
Moreover the rule provides a starting place for analyzing whether any item of
evidence shall be admitted. If the item is relevant it cannot be excluded unless
justified by reference to one of the constitutional or legislative sources
specified by the rule.' 2 The rule does not sanction the exclusion of relevant
evidence on the basis of judicially developed rules of law (constitutional issues
aside), and it thereby deprives any pre-existing exclusionary precedents of their
force and denies the courts authority to fashion new ones. In effect, the limits
of foresight are pressed into the service of admissibility. No additional rule of
admissibility seems to be necessary. '3 Unless excluded by rule 402 or by some
other federal rule of evidence as not relevant, an item must be admitted.
The line between relevant evidence and evidence that is excluded as not
8. FED. R. EVID. 901-03.
9. FED. R. EVID. 601-06.
10. FED. R. EVID. 607-13.
11. The rules do not address questions regarding the burdens of persuasion or production of
evidence, for example, except in rules 301 & 302 on presumptions.
12. Hereafter, for purposes of simplicity, it will be assumed that the only applicable exclusionary
rules are those found in the Federal Rules of Evidence. Taking account of other statutes or the
various constitutional doctrines would complicate the exposition, and would probably not
alter the analysis in a fundamental way.
13. But see text accompanying notes 19 & 20 infra.
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relevant is drawn by rule 401: " 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." The concept of relevant evidence is expansively de-
fined, with an item's relevancy depending entirely upon its logical connection
to the substantive propositions. If the propositions to which the item is related
are determined to be of no consequence under the substantive law, or if
experience indicates that there is no connection between the item and the
issues, then it is not relevant evidence. But the definition does not incorporate
any notion of evaluating the probative worth of the evidence and weighing that
against its costs. Because the second sentence of rule 402 flatly excludes
evidence that is not relevant, the breadth of the definition of relevancy reduces
the scope of the rule of exclusion.
The consequence is that determining admissibility has, for practical pur-
poses, been left to other rules-not just the familiar technical rules such as the
hearsay rule' 4 and the best evidence rule' 5 but also any rules codifying deci-
sions excluding evidence for insufficient probative value. Most significant is
rule 403, which provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." With
this rule, the drafters completed the codification of the traditional relevancy
analysis employed by the courts. Since the discretion granted seems broad, it
might fairly be noted that rule 402 does not provide the final word on the
admissibility of most items of evidence.' 6 The drafters have at least accom-
plished some clarification of terminology. The evaluation called for by rule
403 does not affect whether an item of evidence is relevant. Thus it should be
easier to determine whether an item of evidence is excluded because it is not
relevant or because it lacks sufficient probative value to make the costs of
admitting it worth incurring.
What is not clear at present is whether the definition of relevant in rule 401
was intended to apply to that word, or any variant of it, whenever it appeared in
the federal rules or only when it appeared in rules 402 and 403. That is, it is
unclear whether the drafters defined relevant evidence in rule 401 only to
clarify the terminology employed in the basic operation involved in determin-
14. See FED. R. EVID. 802.
15. See FED. R. EvID. 1002.
16. But it will on some. See the discussion of the role of extrinsic policy in determinations of
relevancy at notes 57-68 infra and accompanying text.
1977:327]
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ing the admissibility of evidence attacked as lacking probative value, or
whether they intended to provide an authoritative definition for use throughout
the rules. This problem is discussed below.
Rule 403 does not give the courts unfettered discretion. First, it authorizes
exclusion of evidence only after a particularized evaluation of the specific item
has been made. In this sense the rule may prove liberating. If there are
precedents purporting to exclude evidence as not worth the risks, those prece-
dents may be deemed undermined by the failure of the legislature to codify
their particular results. Although controversy surrounds the effect to be given a
judicial decision on relevancy, there is certainly no agreement that such
decisions may be ignored. Stare decisis dictates some fidelity to them, how-
ever difficult it may be to decide exactly what this means. However, rule 403
may be interpreted as an invitation, if not a command, to re-examine those
results in light of the standard set forth by the rule. Since the standard is
essentially the common law analysis, it is entirely possible that a court might
decide that application of rule 403 produces the same result, but it will be
attained by applying a legislative standard rather than a previous decision; and
the court may well decide that the result of the precedent cannot be reached by
applying rule 403.
Moreover, rule 403 limits the factors that may be balanced against the
probative value of the evidence. Among other things, the fact that counsel is
surprised by the introduction of an item of evidence is no longer an indepen-
dent factor calling for the exclusion of the evidence. The Advisory Commit-
tee's Note to rule 403 gives two reasons for this. First, surprise is not usually
the sole ground argued for exclusion. Generally surprise "coupled with the
danger of prejudice and confusion of issues" is argued. Second, a continuance
is a more appropriate remedy than exclusion of the evidence.
Perhaps of more consequence is the fact that the rule does not authorize the
exclusion of probative evidence on the basis that its exclusion would further
some extrinsic policy. The drafters have preserved this basis of exclusion,
however, in several specific exclusionary rules. For example, rule 407 ex-
cludes evidence of "subsequent remedial measures" when offered to prove
"negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event." Although
other hypotheses would explain the subsequent measures, the evidence would
no doubt be "relevant" under the definition of rule 401 and thus admissible
under rule 402 were it not excluded by rule 407. The question whether the
same result could be reached under rule 403 will be examined below.
By limiting the factors that a court may weigh against the probative value of
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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the evidence, the drafters have biased rule 403 in favor of admissibility. A
further bias appears in the standard to be employed in evaluating the evidence.
Exclusion is authorized under that rule only if the countervailing factors
"substantially outweigh" the probative value of the evidence. No authority to
exclude appears to exist if the value and the counterweights seem equally
balanced or even if the latter preponderate somewhat. Moreover, even if the
trial court were to determine that the value of the evidence was "substantially
outweighed" by the factors of rule 403, it would not be required to exclude the
evidence.
To determine the object of the drafters in using this language, one must
recognize that what seems to be at stake is the allocation of responsibility
between counsel and the trial court and between the trial court and the appellate
court. The choice of language was designed to reveal the drafter's views of
how the responsibility was to be allocated.
Suppose a case in which the only objection to receiving evidence is that it
would be very time consuming to hear it, and the item is of only marginal
value. If the trial court admitted the evidence, that decision could hardly be the
basis of a reversal. The time has already been expended; requiring a new trial
could only waste more time, and the very lack of probative value of the item
suggests that if it were not presented to the jury on retrial, the result would
unlikely be affected. Nor would there be much value in a reversal as a guide to
future decisions since so much depends on the particular situation when the
question is whether the time needed to hear an item would be well spent or
wasted.
On the other hand, the exclusion of probative evidence as time-wasting
might well warrant a reversal. Certainly if the question were so close as to
induce an experienced trial judge to regard it as superfluous, exclusion would
often be harmless error. The original draft of rule 403 encouraged the trial
court to be as liberal as possible in admitting evidence if the only argument
against it was that it wasted time. A decision to admit evidence was essentially
unreviewable; a decision to exclude might be reversible, but if the trial court
followed the rule's bias in favor of admissibility the harmless error doctrine
would likewise forestall reversals. In effect, the original rule 403 committed
this matter to the trial court's discretion.
If the factors which mitigate against admission relate to possible distortions
of the fact-finding process, the original rule 403 is less clear. The rule appeared
to contemplate that a trial judge might commit reversible error by admitting
evidence as well as by excluding it. By making exclusion mandatory it seemed
1977:3271
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to accord the appellate courts a significant role in controlling the trial courts. At
the same time the rule was sufficiently vague to allow a good deal of discretion
by both the appellate courts and trial courts in its application.
The revision of the original rule 403 supports the conclusion that the drafters
intended to make clear that, regardless of the factors urged in favor of
exclusion, (1) the discretion granted in the rule embraced trial court discretion;
and (2) that there was a bias in favor of admissibility. 7 In effect, it is
incumbent upon the party seeking exclusion not merely to suggest that the fact-
finding process might be distorted, but to demonstrate that the risk is substan-
tial both in terms of its likelihood and the impact the evidence might have.
Under the rule, a trial judge should more readily be deemed to have abused his
discretion when he fails to require such a showing before excluding evidence,
than by admitting evidence notwithstanding the fact that some risk of distortion
of the fact-finding process has been demonstrated.
Finally, the drafters of the federal rules did more than codify a general
framework for the exercise of discretion; they purported to provide for certain
problems by specific rules. Those rules may limit judicial discretion either by
directing that certain items must be excluded or by directing that certain items
must be admitted. Rule 411, for example, is a rule of exclusion within the
meaning of rule 402's phrase "except as otherwise provided . . . by these
rules'':
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not
admissible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise
wrongfully. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of
insurance against liability when offered for another purpose, such as
proof of agency, ownership, or control, or bias or prejudice of a
witness. 18
However, this qualifies rule 402 only in regard to matters within the reach of its
first sentence. If evidence of a person's liability insurance were offered for
some other purpose, rule 411 simply would not apply to the situation. The
evidence would not be excluded by the first sentence, and the second sentence
has no function other than to clarify the limits of the rule.
Since rule 411 does not "otherwise provide" for the exclusion of such
evidence, the evidence would be inadmissible only if it were not "relevant"
17. In this respect rule 403 as enacted contrasts sharply with the original draft, which reads:
(a) EXCLUSION MANDATORY. Although relevant, evidence is not admissible if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, of
confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury.
(b) EXCLUSION DISCRETIONARY. Although relevant, evidence may be ex-
cluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Quoted and discussed in I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 403-[0l]
(1976).
18. FED. R. EVID. 411.
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under rule 402 or if some other rule such as rule 403 applied. Rule 403 might
exclude the evidence as being of insubstantial probative value and having high
potential for harm.
The earlier statement that no rule of admissibility other than rule 402 is
needed should be qualified somewhat. Since rule 402 is limited by the discre-
tionary power of the court to exclude evidence under rule 403, a rule com-
manding the admission of evidence would be needed if the legislature wished
to assure that particular evidence would be submitted to the jury regardless of a
judicial determination of its probative value or its potential for distorting the
fact-finding process. The rule authorizing impeachment of a witness by show-
ing the witness's prior conviction of a crime is such a rule.19 Although the rule
does give some discretion to the judge in certain situations, it grants far less
discretion than the judge would have under rule 403, and in other situations the
judge is given no discretion to exclude. 20
In other situations, the rules may raise questions about whether the discre-
tionary power of the trial court to exclude evidence under rule 403 is still
applicable. Rule 601 makes "every person . . .competent to be a witness
except as otherwise provided in these rules" if the matter being tried is
governed by federal law. If a witness displays characteristics that previously
would have led to his or her exclusion on the basis of "incompetency," may
the court decide any testimony the witness may give is inadmissible under rule
403? Or would that be an impermissible attempt to smuggle concepts of
competency back into the rules? 2' In a like vein, may some negative implica-
tion be extracted from the exclusionary rules that similar evidence not excluded
by the rule must be admitted notwithstanding rule 403? The drafters seem to
have intended to forestall such arguments by providing that the rule does not
"require" the exclusion of evidence not described by it. Such language
19. See FED. R. EVID. 609.
20. Had the rule been enacted in the form submitted by the court, an argument might well have
been made that rule 403 applied to such impeachment evidence, with rule 609 merely prescrib-
ing the outer limits of appropriate evidence. As the rule was enacted, there can be very little
doubt that Congress intended to deprive the courts of the discretionary power to exclude the
evidence. Not only is the language of rule 609(a) mandatory on its face (" shall be admitted"),
but the recent congressional amendment to the D.C. Code to overturn Luck v. United States,
348 F.2d 763 (D.C. Cir. 1965), contained the same mandatory language. In Luck, the courts
had asserted the discretion to exclude such evidence. This legislative history provided addi-
tional confirmation.
21. In United States v. Van Meerbeke, 548 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1976), a witness was asked to identify
a suitcase as having been used in smuggling opium. Finding a bit of opium in the case, he
swallowed it. The witness was permitted to testify after the trial judge made a determination
that he was coherent. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found no error in
permitting the testimony, but commented that no inference should be made "that a judge must
in all circumstances tolerate testimony by a witness under the influence of drugs." 548 F.2d at
419 n.3. Both the trial judge and the court of appeals clearly believed that a court can exercise
discretion to exclude such testimony. Rule 403 is the most likely source of that discretion.
1977:327]
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appears in rules 407, 408, and 411. Other rules present problems, how-
ever, largely as a result of congressional changes. Rule 404(b), excluding
"evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts . . . to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith," contained
similar language when it was submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court.
The House amended the section to read that the evidence "may, however, be
admissible for purposes" such as motive or intent, explaining its amendment
as based on the view "that this formulation properly placed greater emphasis
on admissibility than did the final Court version."22
Since the effect of the Court version would have been to remit such cases to
the trial court's discretion under rule 403 and since the House language is
discretionary, the change might be regarded as purely stylistic were it not for
the legislative history. The House seemed to indicate that it wanted the exercise
of any discretion to be biased more heavily toward admissibility than would
otherwise be so under rule 403. Some discretion, however, remains. One
doubts that courts could alter their behavior to conform to so ineffable a
change. The Senate Committee muddied the waters still further by declining to
change the House language, but adding a gloss to the effect that "the discre-
tionary word 'may' . . . is not intended to confer any arbitrary discretion on
the trial judge. Rather, it is anticipated that with respect to permissible uses for
such evidence, the trial judge may exclude it only on the basis of those
considerations set forth in Rule 403. .... 23 The Senate seems to have been
worried that the House's change, although designed to encourage admissibili-
ty, might be construed as in fact giving the trial court more power to exclude
than it would have under rule 403. Taken as a whole, the legislative history
seems to leave the trial court in about the same position it would have been in
had the language not been amended, but the path to that position seems full of
pitfalls.
The discussion now turns to several problems raised by the codified rules of
evidence that concern relevance. Questions of interpretion and applicability
necessarily arise which in turn affect what role courts are to play in an area no
longer governed by the more flexible judge-made rules of evidence.
II. THREE PROBLEMS IN APPLYING THE RULES
A. The Definition of "Relevant Evidence"
1. The Scope of the Definition
The definition of "relevant evidence" in rule 401 was intended to apply to
22. H.R. REP. No. 93-650, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973).
23. S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1974).
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rules 402 and 403, but it is not clear whether the definition was intended to
apply wherever the word "relevant" or a variant thereof appears in the rules.
Unlike rules 801 or 1001, for example, in which definitions are expressly
confined to articles VIII and X respectively, rule 401 is not so limited by its
terms.
In actuality the words "relevant" or "relevancy" appear rarely in the rules
other than 401 through 403. In two of these instances, the word is used as a
synonym for "germane" or "related" rather than in the sense in which the
word is defined in rule 401. Rule 410, making inadmissible certain pleas and
offers to plead, also makes inadmissible "statements made in connection with,
and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers." '24 Rule 803(15), for
example, contains an exception to the hearsay rule for a "statement contained
in a document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property if the
matter stated was relevant to the purpose of the document," unless later
dealings have cast doubt on the trustworthiness of the statement or the docu-
ment. In both cases the word "relevant" puts an outer limit on statements
covered by the rule.
This does not necessarily mean that the definition contained in rule 401 is of
limited scope. Although that section should not be regarded as defining the
phrase "relevant evidence," it does appear designed to define "relevant" only
in those rules in which the word modifies "evidence." Since "relevant" is not
used to modify "evidence" in either rule 410 or rule 803(15), no problem is
presented by giving the word a non-technical meaning there. In rule 406 and
rule 104(b), however, the term "relevant" qualifies the term "evidence,"
raising the issue of whether the definition in rule 401 controls.
(a) Evidence of Habit
Rule 404(a) codifies the prevailing view that character evidence is generally
inadmissible to prove that a person "acted in conformity" with his character or
a "trait of his character" on a given occasion. 25 But rule 406 also provides:
24. The rule makes one limited exception. If the statement was made "under oath, on the record,
and in the presence of counsel," it may be admitted in "a criminal proceeding for perjury or
false statement."
25. FED. R. EvID. 404(a) provides that:
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion,
except:
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by
an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same;
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of
the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or
evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecu-
tion in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor;
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in
rules 607, 608, 609.
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Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an
organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the
presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the
person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity
with the habit or routine practice.2 6
Have the drafters intended merely to prescribe that "habit" evidence meets the
definition of rule 401, leaving it to the trial judge to decide whether the
evidence is of sufficient value to be admitted under rule 403? Or is the rule
intended to direct the admission of evidence in these cases so that "relevant" is
synonymous with "admissible"? If the rule is to be given the latter construc-
tion, "relevant" must be defined separately for each rule in which it appears
without regard to rule 401.
A priori there is much to be said for the former view. Not only is it
consistent with rule 401, but it is more consistent with the overall framework of
the rules. It would be reasonable to prescribe that "habit" evidence must be
admitted only if the matter cannot safely be left to the discretion of the trial
judge. Despite such anomalies as the no-eyewitness doctrine, 27 however, the
courts have generally been willing to admit evidence of habit or routine
practice, providing that the existence of the habit or routine practice is ade-
quately established. 28 It is often difficult to determine when evidence estab-
lishes a "habit," as opposed to a character trait. Rule 404(a) excludes evidence
of a character trait to prove conduct in conformity with that trait. Is it sensible
to regard the boundary between character and habit evidence as separating a
class of evidence that is never admitted from a class that is always admitted? It
seems more plausible that rule 406 removes "habit" and "routine practice"
from the ban of rule 404(a), leaving the ultimate question of admissibility to be
resolved in each case.
However, certain aspects of rule 406 support a reading that equates "rele-
vant" and "admissible." The rule itself makes the evidence relevant "regard-
less of the presence of eyewitnesses." By so doing, the rule rejects the
majority position that habit evidence may be admitted only if there were no
eyewitnesses to the conduct sought to be proved by habit evidence. According
to this position, habit evidence is sufficiently suspect that it should not be
admitted if alternative modes of proof are available, but habit evidence should
be received if the choice is between it and no evidence. Rule 406's repudiation
of that view implies a more hospitable evaluation of habit evidence. In
26. FED. R. EVID. 406 (emphasis added).
27. Some courts require that there be no eyewitnesses to an event at issue before evidence of a
habit of specific conduct is admitted. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 463-64 (2d ed. 1972).
28. Id.
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addition, the use of a factor such as the availability of other proof to determine
whether an item is admissible is more appropriately an aspect of the evaluation
called for by rule 403. Indeed, the Advisory Committee's Note to rule 403
states: "In reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair
prejudice, consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack
of effectivess of a limiting instruction. . . .The availability of other means of
proof may also be an appropriate factor." In other words, the availability of
other evidence does not affect the "relevancy" of evidence as that term is
defined in rule 401, but it might affect its "relevancy" in a broader sense that
encompasses a rule 403 evaluation.
Moreover, the Advisory Committee's Note to rule 406 contains much lan-
guage to suggest that the drafters believed they were writing a rule of admissi-
bility. It states: "Agreement is general that habit evidence is highly persuasive
as proof of conduct on a particular occasion." The requirement that evidence
of a routine practice of an organization must be corroborated "as a condition
precedent to its admission in evidence," the note adds, "is specifically reject-
ed by the rule on the ground that it relates to the sufficiency of the evidence
rather than admissibility. "29 Similar language is used in the portion of the note
dealing with the no-eyewitness rule. Commentators also support the interpreta-
tion that "relevant" as used in rule 406 is a basis for admissibility independent
of rule 401 .30 Finally, giving the word "relevant" in rule 406 the meaning of
rule 401 would rob rule 406 of any real significance. Even character evidence
has enough probative value to pass the test of rule 401, or else there would be
no sense in recognizing exceptions to the general rule of exclusion in rule
404(a). To declare that habit and routine practice have probative value is to
state the obvious, further suggesting that "relevant" as used in rule 406 means
more than logically probative. It means that such evidence is admissible
without courts making a case-by-case determination under rule 401. There
are, however, plausible explanations for all of these points. Undoubtedly the
drafters assumed, and were warranted by prior law in assuming, that if a habit
or a routine practice could be established, the evidence would be admitted.
Even if rule 406 did not itself call for the admission of the evidence, it may
well have been assumed that an evaluation of genuine habit or routine practice
evidence under rule 403 would invariably lead to the admission of the evi-
29. Emphasis added.
30. Rule 406 is in accord with the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence in adopting the generally accepted practice of admitting evidence of habit
or routine practice as relevant to prove that an act was conducted in conformity
therewith. The reason for accepting evidence of habit when evidence of character is
excluded has generally been explained on grounds of greater probative value.
2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 17, at 406-[06].
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dence. The primary focus of the drafters was probably on making clear that
evidence of habit or routine practice was not to be considered as within the ban
of rule 404(a) and that it was immaterial whether there was corroboration or
an eyewitness. In this light, rule 406 would be of significance if "relevant"
meant only logically probative and not "admissible." On balance it may be
concluded that rule 406 does use the word "relevant" to mean "logically
probative" and is thus consistent with the view that the definition in rule 401
was intended to be applicable throughout the rules.
(b) Conditional Relevancy31
The Federal Rules of Evidence adopt the standard notion that it is the duty of
the trial judge to pass on the admissibility of evidence.32 If admissibility of an
item of evidence depends upon the resolution of a disputed issue of fact, the
judge must make that determination. Rule 104(a) so provides subject, how-
ever, to the provisions of rule 104(b): "When the relevancy of evidence
depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court shall admit it
upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient to support a finding
of the fulfillment of the condition." Unlike the situation in which the prelimi-
nary question of fact determines whether a privilege or an exception to an
exclusionary rule exists, in which case the judge would have to decide whether
the facts support granting the privilege or admitting the evidence, rule 104(b)
requires that the judge be convinced only that a reasonable jury might decide
that the factual condition has been fulfilled.33
To what cases does rule 104(b) apply? If the concept of relevancy in rule
104(b) has the limited meaning given "relevant" in rule 401, it will apply to
far fewer cases than would be the case if relevancy were used broadly to
encompass the sort of evaluation specified in rule 403. Suppose, for example,
evidence of other accidents occurring at the location at which the plaintiff was
injured is admissible only if sufficient similarity of circumstances has been
shown. Should the trial judge decide whether the circumstances are sufficiently
31. For a detailed discussion of conditional relevancy, see Ball, The Myth of Conditional Relevan-
cy, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 295.
32. See generally Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admis-
sibility of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392 (1927); Morgan, Functions of Judge and Jury in the
Determination of Preliminary Questions of Fact, 43 HARV. L. REV. 165 (1929).
33. Rule 104(b) does not address the question whether the jury must be instructed to resolve the
preliminary question of fact first and consider the evidence conditioned upon it only if it finds
the condition has been fulfilled. Neither does it provide whether the judge may simply send
the evidence to the jury without comment, assuming it will be discarded if the jury believes
the condition has not been fulfilled. In either case it seems clear that juries will be made aware
of items of evidence that the trial judge would have excluded if he had had to be personally
convinced that the condition had been fulfilled.
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similar, or should the judge simply hear evidence on the similarity of circum-
stances until he is satisfied that a reasonable jury could consider them similar
and then admit the evidence, with or without instructions?
The Advisory Committee's discussion and its illustrative cases do not
eliminate the uncertainty. The Advisory Committee's Note to rule 104(b)
begins:
In some situations, the relevancy of an item of evidence, in the large
sense, depends upon the existence of a particular preliminary fact.
Thus when a spoken statement is relied upon to prove notice to X, it
is without probative value unless X heard it. Or if a letter purporting
to be from Y is relied upon to establish an admission by him, it has no
probative value unless Y wrote or authorized it. Relevance in this
sense has been labelled "conditional relevancy."
What does it mean to speak of "relevancy . . . in the large sense"? On the
one hand, it could mean that relevancy requires the item be of sufficient
probative value to be admissible after an evaluation such as that provided in
rule 403. Or the "large" sense could mean the "lay" or "ordinary" sense as
contrasted with the "legal" sense of the word. Under this view evidence would
be relevant in the "large" sense if it met the definition of rule 401.
In the illustrations the evidence is described as having "no probative value"
unless the condition has been fulfilled, again implying that rule 104(b) is
limited to those cases in which the question is whether the evidence meets the
definition of rule 401. The matter is muddled a bit, however, because in neither
of the note's hypothetical cases is the evidence wholly without probative value
unless the condition is satisfied. A warning given in X's vicinity has some
probative value on the issue of notice without any further evidence that X heard
it. A letter purporting to be signed by Y certainly gives rise to the inference that
Y wrote it and thus is of some probative value on the question whether Y
admitted the facts stated in it. 34 However, as the cases are described, it is
possible to say this: If the jury decides that X did not hear the statement or Y
did not write the letter, it should have no difficulty eliminating the evidence
from its considerations. Leaving this to jury determination carries no risk of
prejudicing, confusing, or misleading the jury. The only real argument against
admissibility is waste of time, but it is more efficient in many cases simply to
let the jury resolve the matter. As the Advisory Committee points out, allowing
resolution by the jury constitutes less of a compromise of the right to a jury
trial.
34. The note surely cannot be suggesting that the authorship by Y must be established in order to
bring the letter within the admissions exception to the hearsay rule. The resolution of disputed
issues of fact relating to the application of a technical exclusionary rule is clearly the judge's
responsibility under rule 104(a).
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Evidence of other accidents is quite different. There is a risk of prejudice
whether or not the conditions are the same. The jury will not necessarily
discard evidence of other accidents should it decide that the conditions were
dissimilar to those of the case being tried. The jury may rule against the
defendant simply because he maintained a place where people were hurt. Some
enhancement of the probative value by a demonstration of similarity of condi-
tions might be deemed necessary before the risk is worth running. Moreover,
there is a risk that the jury will over-value the evidence if it is insensitive to the
differences in circumstances, and requiring a showing of similarity of circum-
stances reduces the latter risk.
It may, therefore, be argued that rule 104(b) should control only where it is
safe to let the jury hear the evidence regardless of the resolution of the
preliminary question of fact. Rule 104(b) would be limited in this manner if its
concept of relevancy is defined consistently with rule 401. If the preliminary
question of fact affected the evaluation of the probative value and the counter-
vailing factors of rule 403, more would be at stake than relevancy. The matter
would then be left to the determination of the judge under rule 104(a) unre-
stricted by the other rules of evidence. In all candor, no very satisfactory
resolution of this question can be reached merely by choosing between alterna-
tive definitions of relevancy. It is hard to imagine cases in which an item of
evidence is wholly without probative value unless a preliminary question of
fact is resolved favorably. The real distinction seems to be between cases in
which time consumption is the only counterweight and cases in which use of
the evidence involves other costs. But a close approximation of this result can
best be reached by starting with the notion that rule 104(b) applies only to cases
involving relevancy in the rule 401 sense by then giving the phrase "no
probative value" a sensible meaning.
2. Evidence of Undisputed Facts
If a proffered item of evidence is directed toward a proposition that is not in
dispute, is the evidence relevant under the definition of rule 401? More
specifically, is any fact on which the evidence bears "of consequence to the
determination of the action" if it is not disputed? This problem may arise in a
variety of situations. The proponent of an item may concede its remoteness
from the issues in controversy, but nevertheless seek to justify its admission as
background. A proposition may have been admitted by the pleadings, and yet a
party may offer evidence that is relevant, if at all, only to support that
proposition. If the defendant admits an element of the plaintiff's case, what
happens if the plaintiff nevertheless offers proof of the element, or if the
defendant offers proof negating it?
[ARIZ. ST. L.J.
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The Advisory Committee's Note to rule 401 addresses this problem:
The fact to which the evidence is directed need not be in dispute.
While situations will arise which call for the exclusion of evidence
offered to prove a point conceded by the opponent, the ruling should
be made on the basis of such considerations as waste of time and
undue prejudice (see Rule 403), rather than under any general re-
quirement that evidence is admissible only if directed to matters in
dispute. Evidence which is essentially background in nature can
scarcely be said to involve disputed matter, yet it is universally
offered and admitted as an aid to understanding. . . . A rule limiting
admissibility to evidence directed to a controversial point would
invite the exclusion of this helpful evidence, or at least the raising of
endless questions over its admission. Cf. California Evidence § 210,
defining relevant evidence in terms of a tendency to prove a disputed
fact.
Thus, undisputed facts may be "of consequence" and therefore relevant under
rule 401. However, some questions remain.
(a) Background Facts
At least one federal court initially relied on the Advisory Committee's Note
to rule 401 in deciding that the Federal Rules of Evidence created a distinct
basis for admitting background information. 35 The court's reasoning, however,
is arguably erroneous. 3
6
35. Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 525 F.2d 927, modified, 540 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.
1976). The court did not wish to hold that certain evidence of remarriage was not admissible
on retrial in a wrongful death action which would raise questions about whether the original
error in excluding the evidence under the now inapplicable rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure should, in some sense, be deemed harmless. In addition it did not want to hold
that it was required to apply the state statute rather than the federal rules on retrial. The way
out was to find the evidence admissible under the federal rules:
The admissibility of evidence, including the particular kind of evidence involved in
this case, is now governed by the Rules rather than by state law. See Fed. R. Evid.
402. The policy of the new Rules is one of broad admissibility, and the generous
definition of 'relevant evidence' in Rule 401 was specifically intended to provide that
background evidence (the fact of remarriage is a part of Mrs. Conway's background)
is admissible. See generally Advisory Committee's Note, 56 F.R.D. 183, 215-16
(1972). Although the Rules do not deal specifically with proof of a surviving spouse's
remarriage, their treatment of comparable issues suggests that the evidence is ad-
missible for background and perhaps various other limited purposes. See Fed. R.
Evid. 407 . . . Fed. R. Evid. 411 . ...
Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 525 F.2d 927, 930 (5th Cir. 1976).
The court's reference to rules 407 and 411 is puzzling since neither rule authorizes the
admission of any evidence. The court may simply be making the point that evidence not
admissible for one purpose may nevertheless be admissible for another purpose. However,
evidence must be relevant when so offered and of sufficient probative worth to satisfy the
standard of rule 403.
36. The court's reference to the Advisory Committee's Note on the definition of relevant evi-
dence seems designed to enlist the language quoted at note 35 supra in support of the view
that evidence of plaintiff's remarriage met the definition of rule 401 despite the Texas
damages rules. Taken as a whole, the note really does not support this position, but it cannot
be denied that the drafters deliberately omitted the word "disputed" from the federal defini-
tion of relevant. Furthermore, the note contains language indicating that their purpose in so
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To understand the notion of background facts requires some consideration of
exactly when such facts might be excluded. To be distinguished are cases in
which the evidentiary fact is undisputed. If the ultimate proposition is disputed,
such evidence is admissible under either the federal or California37 definition
without the invocation of any doctrine like background facts.
However, one can hypothesize a case involving personal injuries sustained
in an intersection collision. With both the defendant's negligence and the
plaintiff's contributory negligence being litigated, the case has boiled down to
an argument about which party had the green light. Plaintiff is on the stand and
wishes to tell her story of the accident, including testimony about her purpose
in taking that particular route, the passengers in her vehicle, and her approach
to the intersection. Little of this data is disputed. To what may she testify?
Under a rule giving the opponent of such evidence the right to insist that some
connection be shown between those facts and the matter of the green light,
some of this testimony could not withstand challenge. Credibility issues aside,
it might be possible to relate this data to the disputed issue (as by suggesting
that her approach shows that her view of the .light was unobstructed, etc.), but
these theories have an air of desperation about them. Some of the facts might
be useful in assessing the credibility of the witness, 38 but unless one espouses
the view that the jurors' assessment of the witness's credibility might be
affected by their observation of her demeanor while she tells this story-a
theory that might well allow her to read the seed catalog on the stand--even
that is not without its limits.
But the major question is why such an exercise should be engaged in if
opposing counsel cannot point out any serious ill effects. A rule confining a
doing was not only to make background facts admissible, but to eliminate any argument to the
contrary.
The effect of deleting the word "disputed" is not to convert inadmissible evidence into
admissible evidence. Had that word been inserted, as it was in California, CAL. EVID.
CODE § 210 (West 1965), it would be possible to object to evidence solely on the ground that
the issues for which it is probative are uncontroverted. It would then fail to fit the definition of
relevant evidence and would be automatically excluded under the second sentence of rule 402,
even if the opponent of the evidence cannot point to any serious costs of admitting it.
Another way of looking at the choice made by the drafters is that the terms and the burdens
of the argument are different. Exclusion now must ordinarily be predicated on a rule 403
evaluation. The opponent of the evidence is under an obligation to point out the costs involved
in using the evidence. In evaluating the value of the evidence, he would have to consider
whether it bears only on undisputed facts. Clearly, however, it would be inappropriate for the
court to conclude that evidence bearing only on undisputed facts must automatically be
excluded under rule 403 as not being worth the time it would take to hear it. The decision to
reject the California definition of relevant must also be taken as a rejection of any construc-
tion of rule 403 that would produce identical results.
37. See note 36 supra.
38. Section 210 of the California Evidence Code, which requires that the evidence relate to a
disputed fact, specifically mentions the credibility of a witness as a fact "of consequence to
the determination of the action."
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witness to disputed matter only would impose an artificiality on the proceed-
ings that could only be deleterious. If the rule were conscientiously adhered to,
the jury's ability to comprehend the event would be impaired by the fragmen-
tary nature of the story it hears. Moreover, it would put a serious burden on
witnesses who are generally not accustomed to such artificiality in narrating an
incident. A witness would probably require a good deal of pre-trial coaching
before she could limit her testimony to disputed matter and not venture into
uncontroverted areas.
Although one would not expect that every such excursion would be met by
an objection, such a system would afford counsel far too many opportunities to
hector a witness into an incoherent state. 39 Indeed, more time would be
expended wrangling about the rule than would be saved by allowing the
witness some latitude in testifying. The matter is quite different if the opponent
can show serious risks of prejudicing, confusing, or misleading the jury.
By requiring all evidence to be evaluated under rule 403, the drafters have
provided an opportunity for courts to engage in a more discriminating analysis
of evidence often given off-hand treatment as background. Admissibility
makes perfect sense when exclusion will produce confusion, and no serious
countervailing factors appear to be present. In other cases, where there is no
reason to believe that the whole story could not be told or comprehended by the
jury, exclusion may be appropriate. 4° Inadmissibility, however, will not be
based upon irrelevance because it involves undisputed facts, but because in the
trial court's determination under rule 403 (not rule 401), the benefits of such
evidence do not outweigh its costs.
(b) Judicially Admitted Facts
The situation is a bit more complicated if evidence is offered to prove a
proposition that is consequential under the substantive law, but has been
admitted in the pleadings or otherwise. To what extent is a judicial admission
39. Compare Judge Learned Hand's famous remark about the opinion rule in Central R.R. v.
Monahan, II F.2d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1926):
Every judge of experience in the trial of causes has again and again seen the whole
story garbled, because of insistence upon a form with which the witness cannot
comply, since, like most men, he is unaware of the extent to which inference enters
into his perceptions. He is telling the "facts" in the only way he knows how, and the
result of nagging and checking him is often to choke him altogether, which is, indeed,
usually its purpose.
40. By suggesting that the drafters of the rules intended background evidence to come in despite
low value and high potential for prejudice-in fact, without being evaluated at all under rule
403-the first opinion in Conway, 525 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1976), seems to have committed an
error of major proportions. Nor would the result necessarily be affected by the fact that in
Conway the plaintiff gave testimony most reasonably interpreted as saying she had not
remarried. She could be cross-examined on the point for the purpose of shaking her credibili-
ty, but ordinarily extrinsic evidence of the remarriage could not be admitted as the fact is
collateral if damages are not affected.
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conclusive? 4 To what extent does it prohibit proof by the party benefiting
from it?4 2 The common law answer was that in appropriate circumstances the
court had "discretion" to relieve a party of the conclusive consequences of his
admissions as well as to permit the introduction of evidence by the party
benefiting.
It is also necessary in this area to make certain distinctions. A stipulation or
other admission may not reach all the facts sought to be proved by the
introduction of the evidence. In one recent case the defendant was charged with
beating a prisoner in his custody.43 The defendant admitted that the prisoner
had suffered the loss of an eye, but evidently the stipulation did not go so far as
to remove all dispute about the nature and extent of the prisoner's injuries.
Accordingly it did not forestall some proof of those inquiries."
Also distinguishable is the case in which the stipulation removes some but
not all of the issues on which the evidence bears. For example, the defendant
might admit that the plaintiff suffered serious injuries in order to forestall the
admission of grisly photographs. However, he would not thereby render the
photographs irrelevant even under California law if there was a dispute about
the nature or extent of plaintiff's damages.4 5 Finally, it seems to be the rule that
the defendant may not, by admission, force the plaintiff to try the case on a
disfavored legal theory. If, for example, the plaintiff was injured when he was
struck by a car driven by an employee of the defendant, and he seeks damages
on theories of respondeat superior and negligent entrustment, the defendant
may not automatically prevent the admission of evidence that bears upon both
theories by essentially admitting the respondeat superior case. The plaintiff is
entitled to choose his own legal theory, accepting both the advantages and the
burdens of the choice.
46
In all of these cases the judicial admission would affect the value of the
evidence, but in none would it render the evidence irrelevant, even under the
California definition. Suppose, however, that the admission did remove from
the case, by making it undisputed, the only proposition upon which the
evidence might bear. Had the drafters of the federal rules adopted the Califor-
nia definition of relevant evidence, the proof would have to be rejected under
the second sentence of rule 402. However, they chose not to do so, and
41. See 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2590 (3d ed. 1940).
42. Id. § 2591.
43. United States v. Hearod, 499 F.2d 1003, 1004 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. Id. at 1055. When the doctor went beyond the disputed facts to discuss the loss of the eye,
notwithstanding defendant's stipulation, the error was deemed harmless.
45. Compare Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal. 2d 1, 187 P.2d 752 (1947).
46. See Note, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 181 (1977). If the only significance of the choice of legal theory is
to make evidence of an inflammatory nature inadmissible, the wisdom of this rule may be
doubted. Pursuit of this question is beyond the scope of this article, however.
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therefore the fact to which the evidence is related is not automatically of no
"consequence to the determination of the action" merely as a result of the
admission.
As was true in the case of background data, the evidence is relevant under
the federal rules, but it must be evaluated under rule 403 before it is admis-
sible. In United States v. Speltzer 47 for example, the defendant was charged
with escape from federal custody. An element of that charge was that the
defendant had been in custody as a result of having been convicted of a federal
crime. The defendant admitted this fact, but the prosecution was nevertheless
permitted to introduce a copy of the judgment of conviction, which disclosed
that the offense for which the defendant had been incarcerated was bank
robbery. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found this reversible error.
In the court's view defendant's admission did not automatically deprive the
prosecution of the right to introduce evidence of the conviction, but it was
necessary to weigh the probative value of the evidence against the factors
specified in rule 403. One factor affecting the value of the evidence is the
prosecution's need for the evidence. Given the defendant's admission there
was no need for the evidence, and hence it should have been excluded.
Potentially, this analysis is very sweeping. Once it is accepted that the
evidence is utterly unnecessary, it is hard to see how it can have any probative
value. If evidence has no probative value, would not the scales of rule 403
always tip against admission? As previously observed, such a result would be
inconsistent with the deliberate decision to reject the California definition of
relevant evidence. It is true, of course, that the countervailing factors must
"substantially outweigh" the probative value, and this might be enough to
forestall automatic exclusion if all that could be put in the scales were time
consumption. However, as a practical matter, the stipulating party is likely to
be able to point to more serious costs of using the evidence. Assuming that
very little pure altruism motivates trial lawyers, counsel is not likely to ease his
opponent's task unless he gains something from it. In Spletzer, defense
counsel was obviously desirous of keeping from the jury the nature of the crime
the defendant had committed. Bank robbery is likely to be regarded as the work
of a dangerous fellow, who ought to be off the streets. The risk of prejudice is
serious, and the court's decision seems correct. However, one must question
whether this means, in effect, that all proof of admitted facts will be excluded
once some potential for prejudicing, misleading, or confusing the jury has been
shown.
This was not the law prior to the federal rules,48 and it is hard to believe that
47. 535 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1976).
48. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 41, at § 2591.
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the drafters would have made rule 403 a vehicle for denying a discretion
previously exercised. In Spletzer, proof of the crime for which defendant was
held in custody was unrelated to the facts of his escape; the full details of the
latter could be given to the jury without any discussion about the former.
Several cases decided prior to enactment of the rules are consistent with the
view that one party may not, by stipulation, force his opponent to present his
story to the jury in fragmentary and confusing fashion.4 9
Thus, the reasons that have led courts to grant some latitude in the case of
background facts have equal applicability here. The notion that one party
should not be allowed control over his opponent's presentation by stipulation
points up the other "probative value" of this evidence that must enter into the
evaluation under rule 403. Therefore, even if the evidence contained some
potential for distorting the fact-finding process, exclusion would not be auto-
matic in any case in which the evidence could also be "background" under the
prior analysis.
If the party making the admission were to offer evidence tending to disprove
the admitted proposition, a slightly different analysis is necessary. If the
admission was made in the pleadings, rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure would seem to control the matter. That rule seems to contemplate
amending the pleadings unless the objecting party can show real prejudice by
having relied upon the admission to his detriment. Once that is shown the
question becomes whether, by the granting of a continuance, the disadvantage
may be removed. In such cases the amendment of the pleadings has the effect
of shifting the fact from the undisputed to the disputed class, and analysis of
the evidence under rules 401 through 403 may proceed under that assumption.
It appears to be the view, however, that the amendment should be denied if a
continuance cannot be granted.50
Exclusion of the evidence in such a case may also be justified under the
Federal Rules of Evidence. The refusal to allow the amendment would mean
that the fact to which the evidence was addressed would remain undisputed,
but that would not mean that the evidence was not relevant under rule 401. The
evidence might, however, be excluded under rule 403. It would not be enough
to say that the opponent has been surprised, because the drafters omitted that as
a separate ground for exclusion. It could be argued, however, that rule 403
would permit exclusion of evidence on one of the listed grounds, such as
prejudice or confusion, even though the danger was serious only because the
49. E.g., United States v. Brickey, 426 F.2d 680 (8th Cir. 1970); Parr v. United States, 255 F.2d 86
(5th Cir. 1958).
50. 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 482 (1971).
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opponent's reliance upon the admission left him unprepared to counteract the
evidence.
The Advisory Committee's Note supports this notion:
The rule does not enumerate surprise as a ground for exclusion
... . Cf. McCormick . . . listing unfair surprise as a ground for
exclusion but stating that it is usually "coupled with the danger of
prejudice and confusion of issues". . . . While it can scarcely be
doubted that claims of unfair surprise may still be justified despite
procedural requirements of notice and instrumentalities of dis-
covery, the granting of a continuance is a more appropriate remedy
than exclusion of the evidence ....
This suggests an analysis similar to that called for under civil procedure rule
15(b), when the surprise results from reliance upon a judicial admission. The
judicial admissions should not categorically exclude evidence on the admitted
matter simply because the admission concerns an undisputed matter. Exclu-
sion, if it occurs, should be under rule 403, the second step of analysis in
determining admissibility, not the first step with regard to relevance.
B. Construing the Exclusionary Rule: Insurance
Since liability insurance came into widespread use, lawyers representing
plaintiffs in personal injury litigation have wanted to inform the jury that any
judgement entered for the plaintiff would not be paid by the crestfallen figure at
the defense table, but by a wealthy insurance company. Conversely, defense
attorneys have wanted the jury to know that the plaintiff's injuries were
covered by casualty insurance and that any damage awards paid by defendant
would result in benefit to the insurance company. Depending on the nature of
the case and the ingenuity of counsel, a variety of theories may be offered to
rationalize the admissibility of evidence showing the existence of liability
insurance.
If, in a personal injury case, counsel for the plaintiff seeks to show that
defendant was covered by liability insurance for the sole reason that it makes it
more likely that the defendant was negligent on the occasion in question, the
chain of inferences that must be drawn looks something likes this:
Defendant had Defendant was Defendant was
liability insurance -- conscious of -- less concerned
having liability about creating
insurance risks to others
Defendant's Defendant's
behavior was behavior on
more risk- - the occasion
creating than was more risk-
it would have been creating
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This is certainly not a very persuasive set of inferences. At each stage,
common experience suggests competing inferences of equal or greater
strength. Most people do not give their liability insurance a second thought as
they drive, and there are many potent reasons for avoiding injuring others
besides the unwillingness to pay compensation. However, few would be
prepared to assert that no one ever behaves less carefully because he is
insured, 51 and it is a rare trial judge who can honestly dismiss evidence of
insurance as totally without value. To the extent that rules 401 and 402 make
evidence relevant if a reasonable juror might deem the requisite connection to
exist, exclusion of the evidence under rule 402 would almost never occur.
However, trial courts had a good deal of experience in this area. As a
consequence, the inferences needed to link the evidence of insurance to the
defendant's fault had been subjected to critical examination and their weak-
nesses revealed. It was possible to decide that the probative force of such
evidence was so slight as proof of fault that it should never be received for that
purpose, given the risks involved, and rule 411 embodies that judgment. 52
It should be noted that rule 411 contemplates the exclusion of such evidence
as proof of fault regardless of the force of the counterweights of the particular
case. In almost all cases, proof of the existence of insurance could be made
very quickly and would not be subject to reasonable dispute, making the
consumption of time minimal. The extent to which the jury might be preju-
diced would also vary depending upon the nature of the injury (e.g., commer-
cial vs. personal) and the character of the parties. However, the very lack of
probative force of this evidence on the issue of fault minimizes the instances in
which the evidence would be offered without ulterior motive. It is a waste of
judicial resources for the courts to sift through the particulars of each case, and
a flat rule of exclusion therefore makes sense.
Since the rule is grounded largely on the fact that the chain of inferences set
out above lacks force, it is readily construed as limited to situations in which
the evidence is used to establish a party's behavior based simply on inferences
derived from the existence of insurance coverage. The second sentence of the
rule underlines this and illustrates situations in which the evidence might be of
more value. Such evidence might, of course, be excluded under rule 403 since
the risk of prejudice would be the same in such cases and the additional
51. The insurance literature has a name for this phenomenon: "moral hazard." Arrow, Uncertain-
ty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AMER. ECON. REV. 951, 961-62 (1963);
Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AMER. ECON. REV. 531, 535 (1968).
However, few would assert that no one ever behaves more recklessly when someone else will
pay the cost of that behavior-at least the first time it causes injury. Were that the case, the
"moral hazard" would not exist.
52. See the rule quoted at text accompanying note 18 supra.
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probative value might not tip the scales in favor of admission. Although many
courts have seemed entirely comfortable with this two-step process, the evi-
dence in the cases employing the process was clearly offered to prove some-
thing other than negligent or otherwise wrongful conduct.53 There are, how-
ever, two situations that might prove more troublesome because they are not
clearly outside the reach of the first sentence of rule 411.
Consider the following hypothetical cases based upon two New Hampshire
cases: 54 Case Number 1: Plaintiff is riding as a guest in defendant's car.
Defendant is driving at a rate of speed which seems unsafe to plaintiff. Plaintiff
asks the defendant to slow down before he hits something. Defendant replies,
"I should worry. I'm insured for that." Defendant hits something, injuring
plaintiff. Case Number 2: A head-on collision occurs. After the collision,
plaintiff points out to defendant that both cars are on plaintiff's side of the road.
Defendant replies, "Thank God I've got insurance."
These cases are not taken out of the operation of rule 411 by the fact that the
evidence is offered to prove something other than negligence or otherwise
wrongful behavior by the defendant. In Case Number I it is offered to prove
that the defendant was behaving recklessly; in Case Number 2 it is offered to
prove negligence. But if recourse is had to the chain of inference contemplated
in the usual rule 411 case, it will be seen that this evidence is used differently.
One inference required is that the insured party is conscious of that fact while
engaged in the activity. However, in Case Number 1, in which the defendant
refers to his insurance immediately prior to the accident, his consciousness of
insurance coverage cannot rationally be disputed. Furthermore, the statement
as a whole draws the connection required by the second inference: The
utterance itself is an admission that his being insured has made the defendant
less careful about injuring others. The utterance is a good deal more impressive
evidence of reckless conduct than is the mere fact that defendant is insured.
In Case Number 2, the statement is made after the accident has occurred. If
it were offered to prove that the defendant was conscious of his insurance
coverage while driving and thus by the standard chain of inferences had been at
fault, it would not be much more impressive than the mere fact of insurance.
Once an accident has occurred insurance is often pressed into one's conscious-
ness even though one was not thinking of it before the collision. However, the
statement need not be so used. It can be taken as an admission of fault by the
53. E.g., Charter v. Cheleborad, 551 F.2d 246 (8th Cir. 1977); Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak
Co., 537 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1976).
54. McCurdy v. Flibotte, 139 A. 367 (N.H. 1927); Herschenson v. Weissman, 119 A. 705 (N.H.
1923).
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defendant and, as such, would be more persuasive on the question of defend-
ant's fault than the mere fact of insurance coverage.
Under a proper construction of rule 411, neither of these statements would
be excluded. We are not dealing with "evidence that a person was . . .
insured against liability," i.e., with evidence of a status. We are dealing
instead with statements directly evidencing the speaker's state of mind, and in
both instances the existence of that state of mind is highly important. To be
sure, the status is also revealed, but the language of the rule lends itself to the
interpretation that evidence is automatically excluded only if it shows the status
and nothing else.
This leads to Case Number 3, a variation of Case Number 2, in which the
defendant responds, "You can always sue me; I've got insurance." This is not
a clear-cut admission of responsibility; indeed, it is most readily construed as
an indication of an intention to resist liability. However, because it occurs after
the accident, it shares the same weaknesses as the statement in Case Number 2
when offered as evidence of the state of mind with which defendant drove his
car.
However, if rule 411 is construed in the fashion described above, the
statement in Case Number 3 will not be excluded automatically. Nevertheless,
since all three of these statements are subjected to the same balancing process
under rule 403, it may well happen that the statement in Case Number 3,
lacking the probative force of either of the other two statements, will be
excluded by that process while the statements in cases 1 and 2 will be admitted.
An even more difficult case is presented by the facts of People v. Steele55
where the defendant was charged with leaving the scene of an accident. Little
doubt existed that he had collided with a parked car and then driven off.
However, the impact was slight, and it occurred during a snowstorm when
defendant's senses were impaired. It was entirely possible that the defendant
did not know that he had struck the parked car, although knowledge of the
collision was an indispensable element of the prosecution's case. Defendant's
offer of evidence that he had liability insurance was refused by the trial court, a
ruling held to be reversible error.
The reversal seems eminently correct. The fact that the defendant was
insured eliminated one possible motive he might have had for leaving the scene
of an accident-fear of paying a judgment for damages. Since it is the state of
the defendant's mind after the accident that is important, the inference that the
defendant was conscious of his insurance at the relevant time is stronger than it
55. 179 Misc. 589, 37 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Erie County Ct. 1942).
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would be if it were the pre-accident state of mind that was important. Moreov-
er, the alternate modes of proof are absent here. All in all the probative weight
is substantially greater than it is in the paradigm case for which rule 411 was
designed. On the other hand, there is little likelihood that the jury would acquit
this defendant merely because he had insurance. The case for admissibility
seems overwhelming.
Is this a case in which codification requires a different result? Does the
necessary imprecision of language that must be regarded as authoritative cover
a case that it ought not reach? In Steele there is no escape through the argument
that the evidence is not offered to determine whether the defendant acted
"negligently or otherwise wrongfully." That is the precise issue involved. Nor
is escape afforded by the narrow construction of the type of evidence covered
by rule 411. The defendant's status as an insured person is the evidence.
Nevertheless, it would seem that the rule does not require the exclusion of the
evidence.
The first sentence of the Advisory Committee's Note to rule 411 indicates
that in the committee's mind, liability insurance is coupled with negligence or
other wrongful behavior whereas the absence of such insurance is coupled with
lack of fault or wrongfulness. But, in Steele, it is the existence of insurance
that is offered to show lack of fault, the opposite of the contemplated case.
Although rule 411 would bear the reading that evidence of liability insurance
(or the lack thereof) is excluded irrespective of its tendency to inculpate or
exculpate, it will also bear the reading suggested by the Advisory Committee's
Note.56
Thus, only in a narrow area is evidence of insurance categorically excluded
by legislative rule, while the remainder is subject to judicial analysis under rule
403.
56. Rule 411 applies only to liability insurance, not to other forms of insurance. The rule pro-
vides no obstacle, for example, to showing that the accused in a murder case was the
beneficiary of the victim's life insurance policy. Literally the rule would have no effect on the
attempt to indicate that the plaintiff in a personal injury action was contributorily negligent
because he had collision insurance. The Advisory Committee's Note to rule 411 states: "The
rule is drafted in broad terms so as to include contributory negligence or other fault of a
plaintiff as well as fault of a defendant." However, given the rule's wording this can only
mean the plaintiff's liability insurance. This seems anomalous. In regard to the behavior of the
plaintiff, the chain of inferences is essentially the same whether casualty or liability insurance
is involved; accordingly both suffer the same infirmity so far as probative value is concerned.
With respect to prejudice, the apprehension is that the jury will reduce the size of any verdict
if it believes that the plaintiff has already been compensated by insurance, see 2 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, supra note 17, at 411-[04], but it would be his casualty and not his liability
insurance that provided the compensation. Mention of liability insurance would be risky
precisely because it might trigger an association in the jurors' minds. However, these very
factors suggest that if the matter is left to the judge under rule 403, evidence of casualty
insurance will be excluded as easily as if it were covered by rule 411.
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C. The Role of Extrinsic Policy Goals and Judicial
Flexibility in Determining Relevancy
It has already been noted that the drafters of the federal rules included in
article IV several exclusionary rules of judicial creation that rest on the interest
in promoting some objective other than accurate, efficient fact-finding. Rule
407, for example, provides:
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previous-
ly, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culp-
able conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for
another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of
precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
The Advisory Committee's Note candidly acknowledges that social policy
must be relied upon to explain the rule:
The Rule rests on two grounds: The conduct is not in fact an admis-
sion, since the conduct is equally consistent with injury by mere
accident or through contributory negligence. . . . under a liberal
theory of relevancy this ground alone would not support exclusion as
the inference is still a possible one. . . . The other, and more im-
pressive, ground for exclusion rests on a social policy of encouraging
people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps in
furtherance of added safety.
In other words, the evidence would be relevant under rule 401. Its probative
weight may not be terribly strong, but it is probably not so weak that it should
be excluded under rule 403. Rule 407, however, does render it inadmissible.
To probe this a bit further, imagine the situation in which a party seeks to
introduce evidence that remedial measures were taken by a person not a party
to the litigation. Suppose, for example, an intersection collision has occurred,
and the defendant driver offers evidence that after the collision the city
installed a traffic light at that intersection. Or suppose that after the plaintiff
was injured as a side effect of a drug, the Food and Drug Administration
ordered the label warning to be strengthened. 57 The probative value of the
evidence in these cases seems no greater than it is in the case in which
defendant takes the remedial measures, and, to the extent that the rule is based
on the absence of probative value, it is an argument for interpreting the rule as
barring the evidence. However, if one focuses on the policy behind the rule,
the analysis is very different. There may be a slight deterrent effect in the first
case, although it would not be great. There is no deterrent effect in the second
case. 
58
57. Compare Smyth v. Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1975).
58. The possibility that the evidence will backfire against the plaintiff, leaving the jury to decide
that it was the government and not the company who was responsible, is a fanciful notion.
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If the defendant may introduce evidence of the city's action as part of his
defense, he invites the jury to decide that the negligence of the city in not
previously installing the light, rather than his negligent driving, led to the
accident. If the driver escapes liability, the city may be the plaintiff's next
candidate for a defendant. But it is very unlikely that this risk would enter into
the city's calculations. With respect to the FDA, the agency can hardly be
injured by the plaintiff's use of the conduct. To the extent that the rule rests on
considerations of extrinsic policy, it can be argued that rule 407 should not be
applied to this case to exclude the evidence.
The language of rule 407, however, would seem to reach both cases.59 It is
possible by relying on the Advisory Committee's Note, which stresses policy,
to read rule 407 as providing that evidence of subsequent remedial measures by
a party is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct. 6° This is
consistent with the view in the Note that the lack of probative value measured
against the deterrent effect of admission leads to exclusion. However, the
Note's limiting language does not appear in the rule, and the drafters may have
believed more strongly in the lack of probative value theory than the Note
suggests.
Suppose that the city installing the traffic light is the defendant or that the
pharmaceutical manufacturer strengthens its own warning, and the plaintiff
offers the evidence to prove that these precautions were feasible. The second
sentence of rule 407 provides: "This rule does not require the exclusion of
evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as
proving . . . feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted." In a
sense the feasibility of taking cost-justified precautions is an issue, at least
theoretically, in most negligence actions, but controverting negligence must
not imply that feasibility is also controverted. It would appear necessary for the
defendant specifically to deny that it could take the action it did before the
plaintiff could offer the evidence for that purpose.
This requirement that the issue be controverted stands in contrast to the
definition of relevant evidence, according to which the proposition the evi-
dence is directed to need not be in dispute. The effect is to exclude the evidence
unless the defendant injects some issue that would provide another purpose for
59. There is an argument that rule 407 does not reach the traffic light case. In that situation the
evidence is offered to prove negligence or culpable conduct of the city, but that is only of
consequence as a basis for the further inference that the defendant was not negligent. The rule
can be construed to reach only those cases in which the negligence or culpable conduct is an
ultimate issue in the case and not those probably rare cases in which it is an intermediate or
subsidiary issue. However, this line of argument would not exclude the FDA case from rule
407, and it seems anomalous to regard one of these cases as automatically excluded and the
other not.
60. This seems to be the view of Judge Weinstein. See 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note
17, at 407-[07]. See also Farner v. Paccar, Inc., 562 F.2d 518, 528 n.20 (8th Cir. 1977).
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which the evidence might be admitted. Rule 407 in effect confers upon the
defendant a privilege to keep the evidence out, although the defendant may
waive his privilege by controverting some matter, such as control or feasibility,
on which the evidence might bear. This may discourage a defendant from
taking subsequent remedial measures. However, this is not a serious compro-
mise of the policy upon which rule 407 rests. This is one area in which a judicial
admission of, for example, control of the premises by the defendant does bar
proof of the issue if it is to be made by evidence of subsequent measures.
If the matter is contested, however, the court may not exclude the evidence.
Rule 407, like rule 411, does not render the evidence inadmissible. One would
still have to evaluate the evidence under rules 401 through 403, but the drafters
seem to have acknowledged in the Note to rule 407 that even on the issue of
negligence the evidence has sufficient value to meet the rule 401 definition of
relevant. Furthermore, rule 403 does not explicitly authorize a court to con-
sider extrinsic policy goals when weighing evidence under a rule 403 standard.
Consider, for example, the situation in Noble v. McClatchy Newspapers,61 in
which a publisher of a newspaper terminated a distributorship. The distributor
claimed the action had been taken because he would not abide by certain
territorial restrictions in his agreement, and he sought treble damages under the
antitrust laws. The publisher, on the other hand, claimed to have cancelled the
contract because of poor performance. Plaintiff offered evidence that after he
was terminated certain allegedly anticompetitive provisions were deleted from
the defendant's distributorship agreements, and he contended that an inference
of earlier wrongdoing could be drawn. The Ninth Circuit endorsed the trial
court's refusal to admit that evidence, invoking rule 407.
As others have observed, 62 the case does not fall clearly within rule 407. The
Advisory Committee's Note indicates that the drafters were primarily concern-
ed that safety measures not be discouraged. One may be willing to suppress
relevant evidence if the risk of physical harm is involved, but not if the risk of
continued law violation is at stake. On the other hand, the rule speaks broadly
of subsequent measures, and it is certainly arguable that public policy would be
furthered if persons were encouraged to remove questionable provisions with-
out expending public resources to force them to do so.
Some commentators argue that it is not clear that earlier deletion of the
provisions might not have made the event of plaintiff's termination less likely
to occur. 63 But if the plaintiff's theory is that he was terminated for violating
one of those provisions, would not prior deletion have made this less likely?
61. 533 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1975).
62. 1 FED. RULES EVID. NEWS 68 (1976).
63. Id.
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One hypothesis is that the defendant had simply decided to replace contract
provisions with covert pressures and would still have terminated the plaintiff's
distributorship; another is that the defendant in fact decided to abandon the
policy. There is, however, a further difficulty. The defendant contended that
the distributorship was terminated for another reason. If that reason was in fact
true, deletion would not have made plaintiff's termination less likely to occur.
In this sense the preliminary issue of fact coincides with the ultimate issue, but
the parties' positions are reversed. The defendant's objection, based on rule
407, forced him to argue that deletion would have made it less likely to occur,
which is inconsistent with his main position. And the plaintiff's position would
contain the opposite inconsistency. All of this may make rule 407 questionable
as a basis for excluding the evidence. But rule 403 is likewise questionable as
an alternative so that a court must construe ambiguous language without having
rule 403 provide a secondary control on the admission of evidence.
A more painful example of the dilemma posed by the uncertain relationship
between rule 403 and the rules based on extrinsic policy goals was presented by
United States v. Verdoorn ,4 involving rules 408 and 410 rather than rule 407.
The defendants sought to introduce evidence that they were offered reduced or
lighter sentences in return for their testimony. They contended that this would
call into question the credibility of the government's case, but the trial judge
declined to receive the evidence. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed, justifying exclusion in part upon the rationale of rule 408, which
excludes offers of compromise:
Plea bargaining has been recognized as an essential component of
the administration of justice. "Properly administered, it is to be
encouraged." . . . If such a policy is to be fostered, it is essential
that plea negotiations remain confidential to the parties if they are
unsuccessful. Meaningful dialogue between the parties would, as a
practical matter, be impossible if either party had to assume the risk
that plea offers would be admissible in evidence. 65
The court did not suggest that the evidence could not meet the standard of
rule 401 and hence be inadmissible under rule 402. Presumably someone might
reasonably infer that the government did have serious doubts about the potency
of its other evidence if it was willing to make such offers. There may well be
alternative explanations of the offers, but that would not mean the evidence did
not fit the definition of rule 401. However, if evidence is relevant, then it is
admissible unless some other rule excludes it, and the court was vague about
which rule accomplishes this. It cited rule 408, but found only that the rationale
of that rule supports exclusion, not that the rule commands it. In fact the case
64. 528 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1976).
65. Id. at 107.
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seems to fall between two rules. Rule 410 rather clearly deals with a part of the
plea bargaining process, but by its terms makes inadmissible only withdrawn
guilty pleas, pleas of nolo contendere, offers to plead guilty or nolo contendere
to the crime charged or any other crime, and "statements made in connection
with and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers." Only the defendant
may take advantage of that portion of rule 410 excluding the pleas and offers
since only he can actually make or offer to make those pleas. The exclusion of
certain related statements might be read to protect statements by the prosecu-
tion as well as the accused, but the statements must be made "in connection
with, and relevant to, any of the foregoing pleas or offers," and there was no
showing in Verdoorn that the defendant had made any such pleas or offers.
Rule 408 does deal generally with offers of compromise, but it is not
obvious that it applies to criminal cases. In the first place, if it did apply to
criminal cases, much if not all of rule 410 would be superfluous. Second, the
language of the rule seems to contemplate civil litigation. The rule speaks of
furnishing or accepting (or offering or promising to furnish or accept) a
valuable consideration in compromising a claim which was disputed in regard
to either validity or amount. All of this fits more readily the compromising of a
civil claim than a criminal prosecution.
But if rules 408 and 410 do not apply, then exclusion must be justified by
rule 403 or by an extension of rules 408 or 410 to reach a case within their
rationales but not their language. Rule 403 would not seem promising. The
Verdoorn court did not suggest that the evidence would in any way corrupt the
fact-finding process, and the only factors that may be considered under rule
403 are "the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury," and factors related to undue time consumption. If the quoted factors
are construed as concerning only the integrity of the fact-finding process, they
do not permit excluding evidence which does not pose any risks of distorting
that process. It is true that, linguistically, the phrase "unfair prejudice" might
be construed to encompass the Verdoorn situation and the situation in Noble.
The argument would be that prejudice includes any possibility that the evi-
dence will adversely affect the prejudiced party's case. Prejudice is unfair
when it induces the jury to base its decision on emotional factors (which would
rather clearly be a distortion of the fact-finding process) or draw a perfectly
plausible inference from socially desirable conduct (which would not necessar-
ily involve any corruption of the fact-finding process). By this construction the
courts could reclaim the power to exclude probative evidence on policy
grounds under rule 403. An analogous way of reclaiming the same power
would be to expand rule 408 or 410 by analogy. Essentially these two tech-
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niques seem to amount to the same thing. Both admit that the legislature
provided no authoritative resolution of the matter in either rule, and both
assume that the legislature intended that the court have discretionary power to
exclude. The latter technique seems to be more limited, however, since it does
not assume unfettered discretion in the courts to fashion new exclusionary rules
based on their own views of sound policy, but merely discretion to give due
weight to a policy determination made by the legislature. Construing rule 407
to reach situations like Noble in effect treats the rule as providing legislative
resolution of the question. This interpretation of rule 407, like the expansive
readings given rules 408 and 410 above, would limit the cases in which
evidence may be excluded on grounds of extrinsic policy. This position is in
contrast to the broad construction suggested for rule 403. However, such
limited solutions are to be preferred if one has serious doubts about whether the
legislature in fact wished the courts to have the broader power.
If it were clear that the legislature essayed only an interstitial revision of
some aspects of the law of evidence, there would be little difficulty in
concluding that the power to exclude such evidence remains. However, it was
concluded earlier that the federal rules were intended to provide a comprehen-
sive framework within which questions relating to the admissibility of evidence
are to be decided. If this is correct, the court's authority must be found in the
rules themselves.
The strongest argument in favor of the power is the clear recognition in the
rules that exclusion of marginal evidence to achieve extrinsic policy goals is
perfectly appropriate. The Advisory Committee's Notes to such rules as rule
407 leave no doubt that those rules were based upon such grounds. Yet it may
also be said that such Notes also make clear that the omission in rule 403 of any
reference to extrinsic policy was not an oversight, and construing unfair
prejudice in rule 403 to include notions of extrinsic policy would impute to the
drafters an intention to achieve by indirection what might easily have been
achieved expressly. Furthermore, there is no inconsistency involved in a
construction of the rules that denies to the courts the power to create new
exclusionary rules on grounds of extrinsic policy. Certain well-settled doc-
trines are legislatively endorsed, but any new ones must be legislatively
created.
But this response may be thought to lead to an anomaly of a different sort.
These rules are akin to privileges in that relevant evidence is barred on grounds
unrelated to the validity of the fact-finding process. Rule 501 of the rules
provides:
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Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United
States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a
witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof
shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may
be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason
and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with
respect to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law
supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, person,
government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be deter-
mined in accordance with State law.
The rules as submitted to Congress by the Supreme Court contained an
elaborate scheme for codifying the law of privileges, but Congress replaced
them with rule 501. In many respects the proposed rules narrowed existing
privileges and denied to the courts any authority to recognize old privileges, let
alone create new ones. Congress apparently decided that the courts should
define privileges. Is it sensible to read the rules as saying that the courts shall
define all privileges labelled as such, but if new privileges are to masquerade as
matters of relevancy the legislature must make that decision?
Treating the matter as a pure question of policy also produces an anomaly.
Excluding evidence that would assist the fact-finder in order to encourage
safety measures or other socially desirable activities has lost considerable
favor. Doubts are expressed about the impact that such rules have on out-of-
court behavior, and the losses involved in suppression are usually concrete and
tangible.' Yet the same doubts that may be voiced about suppressing evidence
under, for example, rule 407 have been voiced about explicit privileges. 67 The
rules as proposed reflected this skepticism about privileges, and the congres-
sional action seems to have been a vote in favor of privileges. In view of that
courts may well feel more uneasy about admitting the evidence in cases like
Noble and Verdoorn and far less certain that the legislature did not wish them
to have the power to exclude it.
Nevertheless, the courts should not exercise this power. To some degree the
congressional action may be urged in favor of the lack of power. It is clear that
a major concern of Congress was the problem of harmonizing the rules with the
Erie doctrine, and the last sentence of rule 501 as enacted was intended to
mitigate that difficulty. Congress did not, however, recognize that similar
difficulties are presented by rules that are ostensibly rules of relevancy but
largely privilege rules. This problem is acute enough if rules such as rule 407
66. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 17, at 407-[09] and 407-[10].
67. E.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughton rev. 1961); J. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE:
COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 99-101 (1947).
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are involved; it is much more acute if the courts are empowered to develop new
exclusionary rules on similar grounds.68
However, it still must be acknowledged that there is an anomaly in the rules
as enacted which resulted from the congressional changes in article V. Perhaps
all that can be done is recognize the anomaly and attribute it to the fact
Congress' attention was largely focused on privileges and that to the extent that
it made changes, it altered the intent of the Advisory Committee. The bias for
admissibility then, was not affected in those areas in which no changes were
made. One implication of this is that the courts may no longer, on their own
initiative, exclude relevant evidence because they believe some extrinsic policy
goal will be furthered.
III. CONCLUSION
Legislative revision of a branch of judicially developed law inevitably
causes some transitional difficulties. Even if no real substantive changes are
made, it often takes time before lawyers, judges, and law professors get used to
thinking "legislatively" about the area. Naturally, any moderately complex
statute will engender other questions. This article has attempted to highlight
three types of problems almost inherent in codification. The first is the problem
of charting the bounds of authoritative, legislative definitions of terms often
previously used loosely. The second is the problem of deciding what the
legislature has decided and what it has referred to the courts for decision. The
third is the problem of deciding what changes, if any, have been mandated
about how the courts shall do their job.
It is not a criticism of the federal rules that they have not avoided these
difficulties. The task now falls to those of us in the profession to begin
discussion of the problems in the hope of advancing the day when they are
satisfactorily resolved.
68. An excellent analysis of the problems is to be found in Wellborn, The Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Application of State Law in Federal Courts, 55 TEX. L. REV. 371 (1977).
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